We develop a model of nonstationary relational contracts in order to study internal wage dynamics. Workers are heterogeneous and each worker's ability is both private information and …xed for all time. Learning therefore occurs within employment relationships. The inferences, however, are confounded by moral hazard: the distribution of output is determined by both the worker's type and by his unobservable e¤ort. Incentive provision is restricted by an inability to commit to long-term contracts. Relational contracts, which must be self-enforcing, must therefore be used. The wage dynamics in the optimal contract, which are pinned down by the tension between incentive provision and contractual enforcement, are intimately related to the learning e¤ect.
Introduction
Moral hazard pervades employment relationships. One way to alleviate the moral hazard problem is to use contingent contracts. However, the non-veri…ability of workers' performance practically limits the usage of court-enforced contingent contracts. Nevertheless, if an employment relationship is repeated inde…nitely, parties may rely on relational contracts that include both formal (courtenforced) and informal provisions. Since the informal provisions are not legally enforceable, they have to be self-enforcing -that is, each party should have no incentive to deviate from the informal provisions. This self-enforcing requirement imposes a contractual enforcement constraint on relational contracts.
There is a growing literature on relational contracts (Bull, 1987; Baker et.al, 1994; Malcomson, 1989, 1998; Levin, 2003) . However, all of these papers focus on stationary contracts with contractual terms invariant with respect to the length of relationships. In reality, contractual Email: yang.1041@osu.edu. Mailing address: 448 Arps Hall, 1945 N. High St., Columbus, OH 43210. y I am grateful to Jan Eeckhout, Dirk Krueger, Volker Nocke, George Mailath, Nicola Persico, Rafael Rob, Petra Todd, and especially to Steven Matthews and two anonymous referees for valuable comments. I also would like to thank the seminar participants at Iowa, OSU, LSE and SMU for their useful comments.
terms often vary with the length of relationships. The wage-tenure e¤ect -wage increases with tenure -has been a well established stylized fact (Mincer, 1974; Becker, 1975; Jovanovic and Mincer, 1981; Topel, 1991) .
The main purpose of this paper is to develop a model of nonstationary relational contracts to account for wage dynamics. We do so by incorporating adverse selection (heterogenous workers), which creates a learning e¤ect: …rms learn the characteristics of workers as the relationships continue. The main message of the paper is that it is the interaction between incentive provision and contractual enforcement that ties wage dynamics to the learning e¤ect, thus making wage increasing with tenure.
More speci…cally, we construct a repeated principal-agent model with the following key features. First, we model a labor market as a repeated matching market, with matches constantly reshu-ed. This reshu-ing is partly exogenous and partly endogenous, i.e., induced by workers' or …rms' decision whether to continue the current relationship. Second, workers are heterogenous. Low type workers are inherently inept, while high type workers are potentially productive but have a moral hazard problem: they choose an unobservable e¤ort based on incentives. A worker's type is persistent and is his own private information. Third, a worker's output is only observable to his current employer, not to the court nor to other potential employers. Fourth, workers have limited liability. Finally, following the relational contract literature, we assume that …rms cannot commit to long-term contracts; the only legally binding contracts are spot non-contingent contracts.
We focus on high-e¤ort equilibria with high type workers exerting e¤ort in every period. In each relationship, a relational contract speci…es the conditions under which the relationship continues and wage as a function of tenure; and if either party is found to have deviated, the employment relationship is endogenously terminated. The heterogeneity among workers creates a learning e¤ect: as a relationship continues the current employer learns the worker's type more accurately. Moreover, the learning is local or con…ned to the current employment relationships since workers'outputs are not observable to outsiders. To motivate high type workers to exert e¤ort, wage must increase with tenure (at least across some tenure periods). However, the contractual enforcement constraint entails that wage cannot increase too fast with tenure; since, otherwise, senior workers would be less pro…table than new workers, and …rms will renege by terminating the current employment and hiring new workers. This tension between incentive provision and contractual enforcement drives the main results of the paper.
We study the conditions under which high-e¤ort equilibria exist and the wage dynamics under the optimal contract(s) that maximize …rms'expected pro…ts. We establish that high-e¤ort equilibria exist only if the proportion of low type workers is not too small nor too large. This implies that the presence of adverse selection might help alleviate moral hazard when …rms are not able to commit to long-term contracts in a repeated matching market setting. Intuitively, the learning e¤ect created by the presence of low type workers can alleviate the tension between incentive pro-vision and contractual enforcement: the expected productivity of a worker increases with tenure due to the learning e¤ect, so wage can increase with tenure without violating …rms' no-reneging conditions.
If high-e¤ort equilibria exist, then there is a unique optimal contract, under which the wage dynamics exhibits two salient features. First, wage is low and remains constant in earlier tenure periods. Second, when wage begins to increase in later tenure periods, the wage increases are intimately related to the learning e¤ect: the wage increase between two tenure periods exactly equals the increase in the worker's expected productivity. Intuitively, since low type workers are more likely to have a short tenure, in order to minimize the informational rent to low type workers, …rms try to "backload"wages: pay low wages in earlier tenure periods and use wage increases in later tenure periods to provide incentives for high type workers. However, the contractual enforcement constraint limits …rms' ability to backload wages: the wage increases cannot exceed the learning e¤ect. As a result, in the optimal contract the wage increases in later tenure periods are tied to the learning e¤ect. One interesting point is that, although learning is completely con…ned to current matches in our model, the wage increases are tied to the learning e¤ect. This implies that, even without market competition, wages being tied to workers'expected productivities can be generated by internal wage dynamics.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next subsection discusses the related literature. Section 2 sets up the model. Some preliminary analysis is o¤ered in Section 3 and Section 4. Section 5 studies the existence of high-e¤ort equilibria and optimal contracts. Section 6 discusses separating contracts and Section 7 concludes. All of the proofs can be found either in the Appendix or in an online appendix.
Related literature This paper is related to several strands of literature. The …rst strand of literature is relational contracts (Bull, 1987; Baker et.al, 1994; Malcomson, 1989, 1998; Levin, 2003) . As mentioned earlier, this paper di¤ers from those papers in that we study nonstationary contracts. Actually, except for Levin (2003) none of those papers incorporate adverse selection. In Levin (2003) the worker has hidden information. However, the worker's type is not persistent. Recently, Fong and Li (2010) incorporate limited liability into a model of relational contracts. In their model, there is only moral hazard, and the element of hidden information is not present. MacLeod and Malcomson (1988) study a dynamic employment model with both moral hazard and adverse selection of persistent types. They show that the equilibrium contract consists of a hierarchy of ranked jobs, with workers producing satisfactory performance in low ranked jobs having the potential to be promoted to high ranked jobs in the future. In their model, a worker's output is deterministic given his e¤ort. Thus, …rms'learning about workers'type in their model is quite di¤erent from that in the current model, which leads to di¤erent contract dynamics.
Several recent papers study nonstationary relational contracts, focusing on issues di¤erent from the current paper's. Halac (2011) studies the dynamics of a relationship in which the principal has persistent private information regarding her own outside option. Chassang (2010) considers a dynamic cooperation game in which one agent has private information about which actions are productive and the other agent learns the set of productive actions over time. His main focus is on how parties …gure out and settle on the details about cooperation. Thomas and Worrall (2010) study a long-term relationship consisting of two agents who undertake investments in each period. The investments are relationship-speci…c, which creates a hold-up problem. They address the issues of how investment should be structured and how surplus should be divided over time in order to alleviate the hold-up problem. Except for Malcomson (1989, 1998) , other previously mentioned papers on relational contracts restrict attention to one-principal-one-agent settings, thus both parties'outside options are exogenously given. In our model, workers and …rms live in a repeated matching market, thus both workers'and …rms'outside options in current relationships are endogenously determined. A recent paper by Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2011) also considers relational contracts in a market setting. Speci…cally, in their model, …rms o¤er di¤erent incentive contracts and employed workers can search for better jobs. They study how changes in on-the-job search a¤ect equilibrium distribution of contracts.
The second strand is the literature on the wage-tenure e¤ect. There are two existing noncontractual approaches to explain the wage-tenure e¤ect. Neoclassical human capital theory (Becker, 1962; Hashimoto, 1981) argues that wage increases with tenure because individual workers' productivities increase with …rm-speci…c human capital accumulation. The second one is Jovanovic's (1979) matching model with learning. In his model, within each individual match, a …rm and a worker symmetrically learn the quality of the match. Moreover, low quality matches endogenously break up and only high quality matches remain. This learning e¤ect, combined with endogenous separation, leads to the wage-tenure e¤ect.
Our paper di¤ers from Jovanovic (1979) in two aspects. First, our paper models the dynamic contracting problem explicitly. Second, in Jovanovic's model, wages being tied to the learning e¤ect is due to the market's competition for workers, as workers' past performance is commonly observed. In our model, learning is con…ned within the current matches, and the wage-tenure e¤ect results from internal wage dynamics. Felli and Harris (1996) endogenize the wage determination in Jovanovic's model, but they con…ne it to a setting in which two …rms are competing for the service of a worker over time. In their model, the wage-tenure e¤ect exists only if there is a learning externality: learning in the current match also provides information about the workers' productivity in the alternative match. 1 In a pure moral hazard model, Lazear (1979) considers the increasing wage pro…le as a contrac-tual device to prevent workers from shirking. However, he assumes that …rms are able to commit to long-term contracts. Moreover, his model cannot pin down the wage dynamics, as there are many increasing wage-tenure pro…les that can prevent workers from shirking. Harris and Holmstrom (1982) develop a model of wage dynamics based on symmetric learning and insurance concerns. Their model is more relevant in accounting for the relationship between wages and general working experience. Moreover, they also assume that …rms can commit to long-term contracts. The third strand of related literature studies how cooperation can be achieved in repeated matching markets (Dutta, 1993, Ghosh and Ray, 1996; Kranton, 1996; Rob and Yang, 2010) . In particular, Ghosh and Ray (1996) and Rob and Yang (2010) show that the presence of "bad"type agents can discipline opportunists to adopt cooperative behavior. 2 In those models, however, there are no contracts, hence providing no implications about contract dynamics. Moreover, in both models, players perfectly learn their partners' type after the …rst period of interaction. In our model, monitoring is imperfect, so learning is gradual unless separating contracts are o¤ered. 3 
The Model
There is a continuum of …rms with measure 1, and each …rm has exactly one job vacancy. 4 Correspondingly, there is a continuum of workers with measure 1. All workers and …rms are risk-neutral, live forever and share the same discount factor . Time is discrete, indexed by P T = 1; 2; :::. In each period, workers and …rms are matched to engage in production. Each existing match will continue in the next period with probability 2 (0; 1) and break up with probability 1 for exogenous reasons. A match can also be dissolved endogenously if either party in the current match decides to leave the match. All the agents in dissolved matches enter into the unmatched pool, and they are randomly paired at the beginning of the next period. The time line will be speci…ed shortly. Note that workers and …rms are of equal measure, so each agent is guaranteed a match at the beginning of each period. 5 The stage output y for a match is either 0 or 1, and the value of output y is y. Workers are of two types: high type H and low type L. The measure of L type workers is 2 [0; 1], and the measure of H type is 1
. A worker's type is …xed for all time and is his own private information. The two types of workers di¤er in productivity: H type workers have an option to choose a high e¤ort e > 0 or a low e¤ort 0; L type workers are inept and can only exert low e¤ort 0. One interpretation is that, even if an L type worker exerts the high e¤ort e, the distribution of output is the same as if he were to exert e¤ort 0. The cost of e¤ort e is c > 0 and the cost of e¤ort 0 is 0. A worker's e¤ort is not observable.
Output y only depends on the e¤ort level. Speci…cally,
This assumption implies that monitoring is imperfect, in the sense that output does not perfectly reveal a worker's e¤ort. It also implies that a H type worker who exerts 0 e¤ort is the same as an L type worker in terms of productivity. We assume 1 p > c, so the e¢ cient action for H workers is e. A worker's output y is observable to the worker and his current employer, but not to the court or to other market participants. Thus, court-enforced contracts that are contingent on y are not feasible, and there is no information ‡ow between matches. We assume that a worker's previous employment history is not observable to …rms, 6 and a …rm's previous employment history is not observable to workers, either. If a worker is not employed in one period, he gets a reservation utility 0 in that period regardless of his type. Since p > 0, it is e¢ cient for both types of workers to be employed in each period. Similarly, if a …rm does not employ a worker, its pro…t in that period is 0. Firms are not able to commit to long-term contracts. The only legally binding contracts are spot contracts, which specify a …xed wage payment w t . Here t denotes the tenure period (starting from 1), which is the number of periods that a worker has been matched with the current …rm. A …rm may also o¤er its worker a discretionary bonus b t in tenure period t which the …rm promises to pay if and only if y t = 1. At the beginning of employment, a …rm and its matched worker agree upon how the payments are going to evolve as the relationship continues. We name the agreed-upon payment plans fw t ; b t g as contracts. There are two kinds of payment plans: pooling contracts and separating contracts. Under pooling contracts both types of workers have the same payment plan, while under separating contracts …rms o¤er two contracts and let workers self-select in tenure period 1. We will focus mainly on pooling contracts, which are denoted as fw t ; b t g. We will refer to pooling contracts simply as "contracts" unless further clari…cation is necessary. Separating contracts will be considered in Section 6. Finally, workers are subject to limited liability, that is, w t 0 for all t. . In each surviving match, …rms make …ring decisions. If a …rm wants to retain the worker, it o¤ers a spot contract (w t+1 ; b t+1 ) for the next period, and the worker decides whether to accept the o¤er. A match is dissolved endogenously if the …rm …res the worker or the worker rejects the …rm's o¤er. All agents in dissolved matches enter into the unmatched pool. Finally, the next period begins.
Preliminary Analysis
We adopt symmetric perfect public equilibrium (SPPE) as our solution concept. By symmetry we mean that all …rms adopt the same strategy and each type of worker also adopts the same strategy. Public strategies require that each agent's strategy only depends on the public history within the current relationship, since the previous employment history is not observable. 7 Let W t be the total wage payment actually made in tenure period t. The public history of a relationship that has lasted for t tenure periods can be denoted as h t = (w 1 ; b 1 ; y 1 ; W 1 ; :::; w t ; b t ; y t ; W t ). A (behavior) strategy for an H type worker, H , is decision rules about whether to accept the spot contract and what e¤ort level to choose, both as a function of public history. A strategy for an L type worker, L , is a decision rule about whether to accept the spot contract as a function of public history. A strategy for a …rm, f , speci…es whether to …re the worker and what spot contract to o¤er, both as a function of public history. A relational contract, which is a complete plan for a relationship, consists of a strategy pro…le = ( H ; L ; f ). Denote (h t 1 ) as a …rm's belief that its worker is of H type, given history h t 1 .
There is always a trivial equilibria in which H type workers always exert 0 e¤ort, …rms always o¤er 0 wage, workers always accept nonnegative wage o¤ers, and …rms always …re their current workers. Given that H type workers always exert 0 e¤ort, …rms have no incentive to o¤er positive wages and …ring decisions become irrelevant. In this equilibrium of zero-wage contracts, each …rm gets a per-period pro…t p. Such non-reputational equilibrium is not the focus of this paper. Recall that the e¢ cient outcome is for all workers to be employed and H type workers to exert high e¤ort in each period. We call equilibria with this outcome high-e¤ ort equilibria. These equilibria are the primary focus of this paper.
A necessary condition for a high-e¤ort equilibrium is that H type workers should have an incentive to exert high e¤ort e in each period (no-shirking conditions). To e¤ectively prevent shirking, we restrict attention to the following trigger strategy: a …rm retains its worker if and only if the worker produces y t = 1 in each previous tenure period and …res the worker immediately if
Given that only …xed-wage spot contracts can be legally enforced, another necessary condition for a high-e¤ort equilibrium is that …rms have no incentive to renege (no-reneging conditions). Speci…cally, there are three kinds of reneging. First, …rms can renege on bonus b t by not paying b t when y t = 1. Second, a …rm's spot contract o¤er in tenure period t can be di¤erent from the equilibrium payment plan fw t ; b t g, which was implicitly agreed upon by all parties. Third, a …rm can …re a worker even if the worker always produces y t = 1 in the relationship (recall that the …rms' trigger strategy speci…es that a worker is retained if he always produces y t = 1 in the relationship). Intuitively, if senior workers are less pro…table than new workers, then …rms may …re senior workers regardless of their performance. To e¤ectively deter …rms' reneging, we restrict attention to the following trigger strategy: a worker stays in his current …rm if and only if the …rm always pay bonus b t and the spot contracts have always followed the equilibrium plan fw t ; b t g; otherwise, he quits immediately.
We focus on trigger strategies because they provide the severest punishment for the deviating party, thus making high-e¤ort equilibria easier to sustain. A trigger strategy is clearly a best response for …rms since only L type workers produce y = 0 on the equilibrium path. A trigger strategy is also a best response for workers (both types), if we assume that workers hold the most pessimistic belief o¤ the equilibrium path. More speci…cally, once a …rm deviates from the equilibrium payment plan fw t ; b t g, the worker holds the belief that the …rm will o¤er the lowest possible wage (0) in all future spot contracts if the relationship continues. Given this belief, it is a best response for the worker, regardless of his type, to quit immediately after the …rm deviates.
The next simplifying step is that, without loss of generality, we can restrict attention to …xed wage contracts fw t g. That is, it is without loss to set b t = 0 for all t. The underlying reason is that, for any contract that includes bonus payments, fw t ; b t g, there is always a corresponding payo¤-equivalent …xed wage contract fw 0 t g. 8 Therefore, we will only consider …xed wage contracts fw t g hereafter.
With …xed wage contracts, we do not need to worry about …rms'reneging on bonus payments. Note that the workers'trigger strategy e¤ectively deters …rms'reneging of the second category: a …rm's spot contract o¤ers will always follow the equilibrium fw t g if it wants to retain the worker. Therefore, we only need to worry about …rms' reneging of the third category. As a result, …rms' no-reneging conditions boil down to the condition that …rms always have an incentive to retain a worker who has always produced y t = 1 in previous periods of the relationship.
Under trigger strategies, tenure period t is a su¢ cient statistic of the previous public history. A worker in tenure period t means that y j = 1 for all j t 1 in the current …rm and the wage o¤ers have followed fw t g so far. At any physical time P T , H type workers will be in di¤erent tenure periods because of exogenous separation. Type L workers are also in di¤erent tenure periods because of imperfect monitoring. De…ne x t ( t ) as the population of H (L) type workers who are in tenure period t. We restrict attention to a stationary state, that is, the distributions of the types of workers in di¤erent tenure periods fx t g and f t g are invariant with respect to physical time P T . 9 In the stationary state, t = ( p) t 1 1 . Summing up t and using the fact that the total population of L type workers is , we get 1 = (1 p) . Similarly, one can get x t = t 1 x 1 and x 1 = (1 )(1 ) in the stationary state. 10 The following de…nition formally summarizes the equilibrium conditions for high-e¤ort equilibria.
De…nition 1 A (trigger strategy) high-e¤ ort equilibrium with (pooling) contract fw t g satis…es: (i) all workers accept o¤ ers in tenure period 1, and all …rms have incentives to employ new workers (participation constraints), (ii) H type workers will exert high e¤ ort e in each period (no-shirking conditions), (iii) …rms always retain a worker who always produces y t = 1 in the relationship (noreneging conditions), (iv) no …rm has an incentive to unilaterally deviate to o¤ ering the zero-wage contract.
Note that, in the above de…nition of equilibrium, there is no need to worry about …rms deviating to other contracts except for the zero-wage contract. This is because an equilibrium contract fw t g 8 A formal proof of this claim can be found in an earlier version of the paper. The idea is that any bonus bt can be incorporated into the …xed wage payment of the next tenure period, wt+1, without a¤ecting the expected payo¤ for each party. Levin (2003) establishes that focusing on stationary bonus contracts is without loss of generality. The di¤erence is that, in his model, there is no persistent type, which essentially yields a stationary environment in terms of contracting. 9 We assume that the economy settles into the stationary state in the …rst physical time period. 1 0 On the equilibrium path, H type workers turn over only because of exogenous separation.
is like a social norm: if a …rm o¤ers any contract other than fw t g, workers will exert zero e¤ort and quit immediately in the next period (trigger strategy supported by workers'worst belief after observing any o¤-equilibrium contracts). As a result, the most pro…table deviation for …rms in terms of o¤ering other contracts is to o¤er the zero-wage contract. The equilibrium concept adopted in MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) has the same ‡avor.
One important observation is that a …rm learns its worker's type as tenure period t increases. Under trigger strategies, a …rm's initial belief in tenure period t, (h t 1 ), can be simply denoted as t . Recall the assumption that workers'previous employment history is not observable. This leads to a common initial belief 1 about all workers in the unmatched pool. Speci…cally,
From (1), it is evident that 1 is decreasing in . Firms update their beliefs according to Bayes' rule as follows:
Observing (2), we see that t only depends on tenure period t and is increasing in t. In other words, a …rm's belief about its worker becomes more optimistic as the relationship continues since low type workers are gradually weeded out. To abuse notation somewhat, we denote y t as a worker's expected output in tenure period t. That is, y t t + p(1 t ). Note that y t is increasing in t since t is. By (2), we can see that y t = t = t+1 .
De…ne U t (U L t ) as the equilibrium discounted payo¤ of a type H (L) worker who is in tenure period t. The recursive value functions are:
De…ne U d t as the discounted payo¤ of a type H worker who is in tenure period t and shirks only in that period, U
Similarly, de…ne V t as a …rm's equilibrium discounted pro…t who currently matches with a tenure-period t worker:
Note that all the value functions are nonstationary due to the gradual learning e¤ect. Now the no-shirking conditions can be explicitly written as:
Inequality (8) says that, to prevent H type workers from shirking, the equilibrium discounted payo¤ in later tenure periods relative to that in the …rst tenure period has to be big enough. This implies that, in general, w t has to be nondecreasing in t. Similarly, …rms' no-reneging conditions can be written as:
According to (9) , to prevent a …rm from reneging, its equilibrium discounted payo¤ when matched with a senior worker should be no smaller than that when matched with a new worker. That is, senior workers cannot be less pro…table than new workers. Note that both no-shirking conditions and no-reneging conditions consist of an in…nite number of constraints. To ease exposition, we refer to a contract fw t g that satis…es the no-shirking conditions (8) and no reneging conditions (9) as a self-enforcing contract. Workers'participation constraints require U t 0 and U L t 0 for all t. However, given that H type workers can always mimic L type workers, the no-shirking conditions (8) imply U t U L t for all t. Thus, workers'participation constraints boil down to U L t 0 for all t. But given that w t 0 due to limited liability, by (4) U L t 0 for all t is always satis…ed. Firms'participation constraints require V t 0 for all t. But given the no-reneging conditions (9), V 1 0 is su¢ cient. Note that, if a …rm always o¤ers the zero-wage contract, it can earn a discounted payo¤ p=(1 ). Thus requirement (iv) of high-e¤ort equilibria is equivalent to V 1 p=(1 ) > 0, which ensures that …rms' participation constraints are satis…ed as well. The following lemma summarizes the above analysis.
Lemma 1 A high-e¤ ort equilibrium exists if and only if there is a contract fw t g such that: (i) fw t g is self-enforcing, or satis…es (8) and (9), and (ii) V 1 under fw t g is bigger than p=(1 ).
As multiplicity of equilibria is typical in repeated games, in our model there might be multiple high-e¤ort equilibria associated with di¤erent contracts. Note that all high e¤ort equilibria yield the same social surplus since the e¢ cient outcome is implemented in each period. Among all possible high-e¤ort equilibria, we are interested in the equilibrium in which …rms'discounted payo¤, V 1 , is maximized. In particular, we refer to a contract fw t g in the high e¤ort equilibrium that maximizes V 1 as an optimal contract.
The rest of the paper will focus on the following issues. The …rst one is identifying the conditions under which high-e¤ort equilibria exist. The second one is characterizing optimal contracts.
A Certain Class of Contracts
We have two major di¢ culties in our analysis. First, equilibrium conditions (8) and (9) are involved with two sets of an in…nite number of constraints. Second, there is too much freedom in the design of contracts, which consist of an in…nite sequence of wages. Fortunately, we are able to show, later in this paper, that optimal contracts must belong to a certain class of contracts that we call quasi-monotonic contracts. Let t be a …rm's expected pro…t in tenure period t: t y t w t . Quasi-monotonic contracts have two properties. First, wages are nondecreasing in tenure. Second, roughly speaking, …rms'stage pro…ts are nondecreasing in tenure. The only exception is that …rms'stage pro…ts might be decreasing from tenure period T 1 to tenure period T + 1.
De…nition 2
A contract fw t g is nondecreasing if w t is nondecreasing in t. Let T be the …rst tenure period such that wage is strictly positive in a nondecreasing contract fw t g. A nondecreasing contract fw t g is quasi-monotonic if either (i) for any t T , t+1 t , or (ii) for any t > T ,
Proposition 1
If there is a self-enforcing contract fw t g, then there is a self-enforcing quasimonotonic contract fw 0 t g. Moreover, …rms' expected (discounted) pro…ts are the same under the two contracts, V 1 = V 0 1 , and the no-shirking conditions do not bind for any t 2 under fw 0 t g.
The proof of Proposition 1 is by construction, and it can be found in an online appendix. Proposition 1 implies that, without loss of generality, we can focus on quasi-monotonic contracts when we study the existence of high-e¤ort equilibria and optimal contracts. To understand Proposition 1, note that the existence of high-e¤ort equilibria hinges on the tension between high type workers' no-shirking conditions (incentive provision) and …rms' no-reneging conditions (contract enforcement): while the former requires that wage increases fast enough to provide incentive to high type workers, the latter puts an upper bound on the speed at which wage increases to prevent …rms from reneging. For quasi-monotonic contracts, wages being nondecreasing in tenure makes the no-shirking conditions easy to satisfy, and …rms' stage pro…ts being nondecreasing in tenure (except from tenure period T 1 to T + 1) makes …rms'no-reneging conditions easy to satisfy.
The following lemma speci…es self-enforcing quasi-monotonic contracts.
Lemma 2 Under a quasi-monotonic contract fw t g, the no-shirking conditions (8) become
and the no-reneging conditions (9) become:
t for any t > T and T > T +1 ).
Actually, we can go one step further by showing that optimal contracts must be quasi-monotonic.
Proposition 2 (i) If a quasi-monotonic contract is self-enforcing, but the no-shirking condition (10) is not binding, then it cannot be optimal; (ii) If a self-enforcing contract fw t g is not quasimonotonic, then it cannot be optimal.
To understand part (ii) of Proposition 2, note that, in optimal contracts, …rms try to minimize the informational rent to low type workers. To motivate high type workers wages have to be strictly positive at some point. Since low type workers can mimic high type workers with some success, they will enjoy informational rent. Given that low type workers are more likely in earlier tenure periods, to reduce the informational rent …rms have an incentive to keep wages as low as possible in earlier tenure periods and use wage increases in later tenure periods to motivate high type workers. That is, …rms have incentives to backload wages as much as possible. However, …rms' ability to backload wages is restricted by the no-reneging conditions as backloading wages will necessarily make hiring new workers more pro…table than retaining workers in later tenure periods. Intuitively, if a contract is not quasi-monotonic, then it does not backload wages enough. Speci…cally, if wages are not nondecreasing (strictly decrease between some tenure periods), then the wages in some earlier tenure periods are too high and …rms can backload wages further. Similarly, if …rms stage pro…ts are not nondecreasing (strictly decrease between some tenure periods), it implies that wages in some later tenure periods are not high enough, 11 and …rms have room to backload wages further. For these reasons, optimal contracts must be quasi-monotonic.
From now on, we will focus on quasi-monotonic contracts. Formally, we de…ne the following programming problem [PP]: max quasi-montonic fwtg V 1 subject to : (i) the no-shirking condition (10) holds,
By Lemmas 1 and 2 and Proposition 1, a high-e¤ort equilibrium exists if and only if there is a quasi-monotonic contract fw t g satisfying the three constraints of [PP], and optimal contracts are solutions to [PP] . Note that a bigger V 1 makes constraint (iii) more easily satis…ed. Therefore, the existence of high-e¤ort equilibria boils down to the condition that [PP] has a solution. Moreover, by part (ii) of Proposition 2, optimal contracts must be solutions to [PP].
Existence of High-e¤ort Equilibria and Optimal Contracts
Inspecting the programming problem [PP], two observations are in order. First, w 1 = 0 in optimal contracts since what matters for the no-shirking and the no-reneging conditions is the wage increases across tenure periods, w t . Second, by part (i) of Proposition 2, in optimal contracts the no-shirking condition (10) must be binding.
Lemma 3
If the programming problem [PP] has a solution, it also has a solution of the following form: (i) t = T +1 for any t > T + 1, (ii) V T +1 = V 1 and
Moreover, optimal contracts must have the above form.
Lemma 3 provides a sharper characterization of the optimal contracts. Speci…cally, after tenure period T +1 (the second tenure period in which the wage is strictly positive), …rms'stage pro…ts are constant, which implies that the increase in wage exactly matches the increase in workers'expected productivity. Moreover, …rms'no-reneging conditions are binding after tenure period T + 1, which implies that …rms' (constant) stage pro…t after tenure period T + 1 is a weighted average of the stage pro…ts in the …rst T tenure periods (equation (11)). Intuitively, Lemma 3 results from …rms' incentive to backload wages. To minimize informational rents to low type workers, it is always better for …rms to minimize wages in earlier tenure periods and maximize wage increases in later tenure periods to provide incentive for high type workers. Subject to the constraint that …rms' stage pro…ts are nondecreasing after tenure period T + 1, the contracts in which …rms'stage pro…ts are constant in all later tenure periods maximize wage increases in later tenure periods.
Notice that …rms' stage pro…t t is increasing from tenure period 1 to T 1. By Lemma 3,
T is greater than the weighted average of t (1 t T 1), and t (t T + 1) is equal to the weighted average of the stage pro…ts from tenure period 1 to T . Therefore, t 1 for any t. As a result, V 1 1 =(1 ) = y 1 =(1 ) p=(1 ). This implies that, if an optimal contract exists, …rms have no incentive to deviate to the zero-wage contract (we can ignore requirement (iii) of the programming problem [PP]).
Lemma 3 indicates that optimal contracts are characterized by T (T 2) and w T , the …rst tenure period in which wage is strictly positive and the wage in that tenure period. Once T and w T are determined, w T +1 is determined by equation (11) and wages in later tenure periods are determined by the condition of constant stage pro…ts. To ease exposition, we de…ne
where
by (11) Essentially, G(T; w T ) is the LHS of (10) (or the discounted sum of wage increases) under the class of contracts speci…ed in Lemma 3 with T and w T , which measures the incentive provided to high type workers.
Lemma 4 shows that, as w T increases, the contract provides more incentive to high type workers. This is intuitive since an increase in w T will lead to an increase in w T +1 by (11) . Thus, the overall wage will increase more from tenure period T 1 to T + 1, and a higher proportion of the wage increase occurs from tenure period T 1 to T . Both e¤ects lead to more incentive provision. Essentially, g(T ) is the maximum incentive that could be provided given T . Lemma 4 shows that incentive provision is decreasing in T . Intuitively, an increase in T has two e¤ects. First, it directly delays the wage increases. Second, it reduces the overall amount of wage increases. This is because it increases …rms'stage pro…ts in earlier tenure periods. To satisfy …rms'no reneging conditions, it implies higher stage pro…ts and lower wages in later tenure periods. Both e¤ects lead to less incentive provision.
Existence of High-e¤ort Equilibria
By Lemmas 3 and 4, the programming problem [PP] has a solution if and only if the maximum incentive provided with T = 2 is enough to motivate high type workers. More formally, the condition can be written as g(2) b c. Actually, the contract that provides the maximum incentive (corresponds to g (2)) is a constant-stage-pro…t contract ( t is constant in t) in which the wage increases exactly match the increases in workers'expected productivity or the learning e¤ect. More explicitly, the condition g(2) b c can be written as
Note that t (for all t) is a function of 1 , the initial belief. Therefore, the left hand side of (13) is a function of 1 , which we de…ne as f ( 1 ). Intuitively, f ( 1 ) measures the maximum incentive provision given initial belief 1 .
Lemma 5 is driven by the belief updating process. Essentially, f ( 1 ) is the discounted sum of belief increases. When the initial belief is extreme (either 0 or 1), there is no belief updating. Thus f (0) = f (1) = 0. To understand that the discounted sum of belief increases is concave in initial belief, note that belief t converges to 1 as t goes to in…nity. If the initial belief 1 is high,
then the room for overall belief increase (1 1 ) is small, which leads to a small discounted sum of belief increases. Conversely, when the initial belief 1 is small, although the room for overall belief increase is big, belief updating in earlier tenure periods will be slow. Due to discounting, the discounted sum of belief increases will be small as well. ( 1 ) = 0. Thus, a necessary condition for condition (13) to hold is
Note that f ( 1 ) is independent of c. Thus, (14) is satis…ed if c is small enough. If (14) Proposition 3 implies that adverse selection helps alleviate moral hazard when …rms are not able to commit to long-term contracts and all agents are able to change their partners freely in a market. This result is driven by the tension between incentive provision and contractual enforcement, as mentioned earlier. Incentive provision requires that the discounted sum of wage increases be big enough in order to motivate high type workers. However, contractual enforcement requires that the wage increases cannot exceed the increases of workers'expected output (the speed of learning), since, otherwise, longer-tenured workers are less pro…table than new workers and …rms will have incentives to renege. If there are no low type workers, then the learning e¤ect is absent, and contractual enforcement requires that wage be constant. As a result, no incentive can be provided and high-e¤ort equilibria cannot be sustained. 12 On the other hand, the presence of lower type workers can alleviate the tension between incentive provision and contractual enforcement by creating the learning e¤ect. With the learning e¤ect, workers'expected output is increasing with tenure, so an increasing wage contract can still satisfy the contractual enforcement constraint as long as wage increases more slowly than expected output does. Moreover, how fast wages can increase without violating the contractual enforcement constraint depends on the belief updating process. If the proportion of low type workers is too small, then the magnitude of belief updating is too small, thus not enough incentives can be provided. On the other end of spectrum, if the proportion of low type workers is too big, belief updates slowly in earlier tenure periods. Because of discounting, not enough incentives can be provided, either.
The assumption that both workers'past performance (in previous …rms) and previous employment history are not observable (no record-keeping) is essential in sustaining high-e¤ort equilibria. If a worker's past track-record were observable, then high-e¤ort equilibria cannot be sustained, similar to the result in Mailath and Samuelson (2001) . Intuitively, perfect record-keeping would destroy the learning e¤ect in individual matches, which leads to a constant wage by the contract enforcement constraint, and, therefore, no incentive can be provided. Thus, in some sense, the absence of information ‡ows among matches is bene…cial in overcoming moral hazard in market settings.
Proposition 3 is derived under the assumption that there is no matching friction in markets. Matching friction, as shown by MacLeod and Malcomson (1998) and Yang (2008) , also can alleviate moral hazard, since it generates a positive surplus in current employment relationships. 13 Broadly speaking, Proposition 3 can be understood as follows: to overcome moral hazard in markets, there must be some friction, and the friction can come from either matching friction or adverse selection. 14 However, if there is only matching friction, then stationary bonus contracts are optimal since the surplus of current employment relationships is independent of tenure. Given the fact that wage increases with tenure (thus not stationary) in reality, we believe that adverse selection plays a role in determining wage dynamics.
Optimal Contracts
Now we characterize the optimal contracts, assuming the programming problem [PP] has a solution (g (2) b c holds) .
Proposition 4 Suppose (14) holds and
There is a unique optimal contract, which is quasi-monotonic and characterized by T and w T . The unique T satis…es g(T )
b c and g(T + 1) < b c, and w T is determined by G(T ; w T ) = b c. In the optimal contract, w t = 0 if t < T , w T +1 is determined by (12) , and for t > T + 1 the wage increases are equal to the increases in worker's expected output: w t+1 w t = y t+1 y t .
The optimal contract is determined by three forces. First, to provide incentives to high type workers, the discounted sum of wage increases must be equal to a given level. Second, to reduce informational rent to low type workers, …rms try to backload wages as much as possible since low type workers are more likely to be in earlier tenure periods. Third, …rms'ability to backload wages is limited by …rms'no-reneging conditions: senior workers have to be more pro…table than new workers. The last two forces pin down the form of optimal contracts: …rms'stage pro…ts are constant in later tenure periods and wages in early tenure periods are low and constant (zero). By Lemma 4, within this form of contracts, backloading wages more (delaying the …rst tenure period in which wage is strictly positive) leads to less incentive provision. In the optimal contract, wages are backloaded as much as possible subject to (just) enough incentive being provided to high type workers.
To get a better feel for the contract dynamics, Figure 3 illustrates the evolution of …rms'stage pro…ts t and …rms' discounted expected payo¤ V t under the optimal contract. In this example, wage starts to increase in tenure period 3 (T = 3). Firms'stage pro…ts …rst increase, then reach their maximum in tenure period 2, decrease in tenure periods 3 and 4, and remain constant in all later tenure period. Firms' discounted payo¤ exhibits the same pattern. Moreover, for t 4,
By Proposition 4, the wage dynamics in the optimal contract exhibits two salient features. First, wage is low and remains constant in earlier tenure periods. Second, when wage starts to increase in later tenure periods, it is intimately related to the learning e¤ect: the wage increase in each tenure period (after tenure period T ) is exactly equal to the increase in a worker's expected output. This is because the stage pro…t is constant after wage starts to increase. The wage dynamics exhibited by the optimal contract in our model are di¤erent from those in Jovanovic (1979) in two aspects. First, in his model, wage in each tenure period is exactly equal to a worker's expected productivity. In contrast, in our model, wages are low and constant in earlier tenure periods, and only the wage increase in later tenure periods is equal to the increase in a worker's expected productivity. Second, in his model, the fact that wage always matches a worker's expected productivity is due to market competition. In contrast, in our model, workers' performance is not observed by the market; yet, in the optimal contract, the wage increases are intrinsically tied to workers' performance. This implies that, even without market competition, wages being tied to workers'expected productivities can be generated by internal wage dynamics. In our model, it is the interaction between incentive provision and contractual enforcement that leads to the internal wage dynamics being tied to the learning e¤ect. Note that both incentive provision and contractual enforcement are indispensable. Suppose there is no moral hazard, then wage need not increase to provide incentives. On the other hand, suppose contractual enforcement is not an issue (say …rms are able to commit to long-term contracts), then the wage increases can be arbitrary, as …rms can backload wages as much as possible. 15 Limited liability is essential in deriving the optimal contract. Basically, limited liability ensures that low type workers will get positive rents by mimicking high type workers. This creates an incentive for …rms to backload wages in order to reduce low type workers' informational rent. Without limited liability, …rms can change the wage pro…le (change wages in all tenure periods by a constant) such that low type workers always get zero rent. As a result, …rms would have no incentive to backload wages since low type workers will get zero rent anyway, although they still need to backload wages in order to provide incentive for high type workers. This implies that there are many optimal contracts and the wage dynamics in optimal contracts can be of various form. 16 To better understand the bite of the "relational"aspect on the optimal contracts, here we brie ‡y discuss the form of the optimal long-term contracts. Since …rms' reneging is not an issue under long-term contracts, …rms will try to backload wage as much as possible in order to reduce the information rent for low type workers. Therefore, the form of the optimal long-term contracts is as follows: wage starts at zero and remains at zero for many tenure periods, then at some tenure period there is a signi…cant jump of wage and it remains constant in all later tenure periods. Compared to the optimal long-term contracts, we can clearly see that the "relational" aspect of contracts limits …rms'ability to backload wages, which ties the wage increases in the optimal (relational) contract to the learning e¤ect.
So far we have focused on contracts that maximize …rms' expected pro…t. Contracts that maximize …rms' and high type workers' joint surplus would have the same qualitative feature as the contracts maximizing …rms' pro…t. This is because both require that the payo¤ to low type workers be minimized, so wages should be backloaded as much as possible. Of course, as high type workers'share of the surplus increases, low type workers'payo¤ will increase as well, as they can always mimic high type workers with some success.
Separating Contracts
Given that there are two types of workers, theoretically speaking, …rms could o¤er separating contracts: …rms o¤ers two contracts and let workers self-select in tenure period 1. Speci…cally, in the contract designed for L type workers, a …xed wage w L is o¤ered in tenure period 1, and the worker is …red after tenure period 1 regardless of the output. In the contract designed for H type even if tenure period t is veri…able.
workers, the payment plan evolves according to fw s t g. In short, we denote a separating contract as (w L ; fw s t g). In the rest of this section, we just provide the main results regarding separating contracts. The detailed analysis can be found in an online appendix.
Compared to pooling contracts, separating contracts lead to several di¤erences. First, with separating contracts …rms learn the type of new workers in the …rst tenure period, while under pooling contracts the learning is gradual. Second, with separating contracts there are two additional self-selection constraints: L type workers have no incentive to choose the contract for type H, and H type workers have no incentive to choose the contract for type L. Without loss of generality, w L should be set such that type L workers are indi¤erent between choosing the contract for type H and choosing the contract for type L. That is, w L equals the average per-period payo¤ if an L type chooses the H contract fw s t g. It turns out that the self-selection constraint for type H is redundant. Intuitively, if an H type worker chooses contract w L , he gets the same payo¤ when he chooses contract fw s t g and shirks in every period. Therefore, no-shirking conditions imply that H type workers have no incentive to choose the L contract.
The self-selection constraint for L types deserves further comment. In typical repeated adverse selection models (e.g., La¤ont and Tirole, 1990) , inducing separation in the …rst period is very costly, as the discounted sum of informational rents in all future periods has to be paid in the …rst period.
Translating into our setting, w L would have been punishment for reneging. Recall Proposition 3. Self-enforcing pooling contracts exist if and only if the proportion of L type workers is not too low or too high. The di¤erence comes from the fact that, with pooling contracts, the wage increases cannot exceed the speed of learning. When the proportion of L type workers is too high, the belief updating will be very slow initially, and due to discounting, not enough incentives can be provided to H type workers.
If high-e¤ort equilibria exist, then the optimal separating contract (which maximizes …rms' expected pro…t) is unique. Speci…cally, the optimal separating contract has the following form: the wage is zero in early tenure periods, and then it increases for two tenure periods and stays constant in later tenure periods. The forces that determine the optimal separating contract are similar to those that govern the optimal pooling contract. To provide incentives to high type workers, the discounted sum of wage increases must be big enough. To reduce informational rent to low type workers, …rms try to backload wages as much as possible. However, …rms'ability to backload wages is limited by …rms' no-reneging conditions. The last two forces lead to constant stage pro…ts in later tenure periods and constant (zero) wage in early tenure periods.
The wage dynamics in the optimal separating contract and the optimal pooling contract share a similar feature: wage is low and remains constant in earlier tenure periods. The di¤erence is that, in the optimal separating contract, wage increases at most in two tenure periods, and then wage remains constant afterwards. This di¤erence comes from the fact that learning is completed in the …rst tenure period under separating contracts. Thus, constant stage pro…ts in later tenure periods imply constant wage.
Compared to pooling contracts, high-e¤ort equilibria exist for a wider range of parameter values under separating contracts. The intuition for this result is as follows. Under separating contracts, since learning is completed in the …rst tenure period, subject to the no-reneging conditions, the maximum amount of wage increase can occur in the second tenure period. On the other hand, since under pooling contracts learning occurs gradually, the same amount of wage increase has to be spread over many tenure periods. Due to discounting, less incentive is provided to H type workers with pooling contracts.
If higher-e¤ort equilibria exist under both contracts, it can be shown that the optimal separating contract yields a higher pro…t for …rms than the optimal pooling contract does. The intuition for the comparison is as follows. Under both types of contracts, …rms'ability to backload wages are more or less the same. Under pooling contracts, …rms'ability to backload wages is dictated by the gradual increase of beliefs about workers as tenure period increases. Under separating contracts, though learning is completed in tenure period 1, …rms are able to backload wages since, in tenure period 1, workers are very likely to be of low type. Comparing separating contracts and pooling contracts, there is an additional e¤ect that favors separating contracts. With separating contracts, a …rm is able to learn the type of a new worker immediately. In contrast, with pooling contracts it takes a longer time for a …rm to learn a worker's type. Thus, with the same initial beliefs, on average it takes a shorter time for a …rm to match with an H type worker with separating contracts. This fast screening e¤ect favors separating contracts.
Although the optimal separating contract yields a higher pro…t for …rms, we believe that pooling contracts are more relevant: in the real world, we seldom see …rms o¤er multiple contracts to common workers and let them self-select. For example, Bewley (1999) found that …rms intentionally avoid paying workers assigned to similar tasks di¤erentiated wages. This suggests that pooling contracts are more likely to be the social norm. 18 Recall that there is no cost of separating in our current setting. However, in the real world the following factors (outside the model) tend to give rise to the cost of separating and favor pooling contracts. First, o¤ering di¤erent wages might dampen workers'overall morale, as shown in Fang and Moscarini (2005) . Speci…cally, they show that, when workers' e¤ort and ability are complements in production, …rms do not want to o¤er di¤erent wage contracts to workers. Second, it might be the case that with some positive probability previous employment history is observed by new employers. Thus, always selecting the L contract and getting …red immediately will cause some new employers to o¤er zero wage instead, which makes L type workers reluctant to choose the L contract. Finally, turnover costs in the real world will lead to a positive cost of separating. The turnover costs could be physical costs involved in changing jobs or due to the presence of unemployment. Intuitively, when the turnover costs are present, L types have incentives to pool with H types in the current match to avoid separation, since separation now will lead to a lower continuation payo¤. As a result, to induce immediate type revelation, the …rm has to pay a higher w L to compensate for separation. 19 As the turnover costs increases, in order to induce immediate type revelation the payment to an L type becomes closer to the discounted sum of informational 1 8 Note that the (relational) contract serves as some sort of social norm, which pins down agents'beliefs on and o¤ the equilibrium path. 1 9 To illuestrate the idea, consider the case of positive unempolyment. Suppose the measure of workers is still 1, but the measure of …rms is 2 (0; 1). That is, workers are on the long side of the market. Now, workers in the unmatched pool may not get a match. Let 2 (0; 1) be the probability that a worker in the unmatched pool matches with a …rm. Obviously, is increasing in . Suppose …rms o¤er both types a pooling contract fwtg. De…ne U L u as a L type's payo¤ when he is in the unmatched pool, and U L 1 as a L type's payo¤ when he is just matched with a …rm and always chooses the H contract.
Now to induce immediate type revelation,
rents in the current relationship. 20 
Conclusions
This paper studies nonstationary relational contracts driven by the presence of adverse selection. The internal wage dynamics are pinned down by the tension between incentive provision and contractual enforcement. The paper contributes to the understanding of how contractual enforcement restricts …rms'ability in o¤ering long-term contracts in nonstationary environments. Moreover, the paper shows that, when contractual enforcement is an issue and agents are free to change partners in markets, adverse selection can alleviate moral hazard. Although our model is framed in a labor market setting, it can be applied to broader settings. In fact, it applies to markets in which both moral hazard and adverse selection exist and contractual enforcement is an issue. The internal wage dynamics derived in our model can be generalized as internal contract dynamics. Two relevant examples are lending markets and buyer-seller relationships. In the context of lending markets, 21 our model implies that, as a lending relationship continues, the contractual terms should become more favorable to the borrower, who has the moral hazard problem. This is consistent with the phenomenon of relationship lending: borrowers with longer relationships with a bank pay lower interest rates and are less likely to pledge collateral (Berger and Udell, 1995; Bodenhorn, 2003) .
(ii) If t+1 t for any t T , then V T V 1 implies …rms'no-reneging conditions (9) . To prove this claim, we …rst show that V t V 1 for any t > T . Suppose V T +1 < V 1 . Then, combining with
where the inequality follows t+1 t for any t T and T > (1 )V 1 ; a contradiction. Therefore, V T +1 V 1 . By similar arguments, we can recursively show that V t V 1 for any t > T .
Next we show that V t V 1 for any t < T (this step is necessary only if T > 2). Suppose
Since t is increasing in the domain from 1 to T , We have V T 2 = T 2 + [
Applying this argument recursively, eventually we have,
2 )V 1 ] < V 1 , a contradiction. Therefore, V T 1 V 1 . By similar arguments, we can show that V t V 1 for any t < T .
(3) If t+1 t for any t > T and T > T +1 , then V T +1 V 1 implies that V t V 1 for any t. Recall that this type of quasi-monotonic contract must have T (1 )V 1 . Combining with V T +1 V 1 , we have V T V 1 . The rest of the proof is the same as the proof in (2). upper bound on w T . Substituting in this upper bound, we have
Inspecting (16), we see that g(T ) is decreasing in T .
Proof of Lemma 5.
Proof. It is easy to verify that f (0) = f (1) = 0, since t = 0 (for all t) if 1 = 0 and t = 1 (for all t) if 1 = 1. Expand f ( 1 ) and take the derivative with respect to 1 : < 0 or f ( 1 ) is strictly concave.
Proof of Proposition 4.
Proof. By Proposition 2 and Lemma 3, optimal contracts must be quasi-monotonic and are characterized by T and w T . Given T and w T , w T +1 can be computed according to (12) . For all t < T , w t = 0, and for t > T + 1, w t = w T +1 + (y t y T +1 ) by the constant-stage-pro…t requirement. The binding (10) pins down optimal contracts: G(T; w T ) = b c. We …rst determine T . By Lemma 4, g(T ) is decreasing in T . Moreover, lim T !1 g(T ) = 0 and g(2) b c. Therefore, there is a unique T such that g(T ) b c and g(T +1) < b c. Given T , there is a unique w T 2 (0;
such that G(T ; w T ) = b c. Therefore, the optimal contract is unique.
